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insomuch as the court recognizes that it is the duty of the legislature to
know of such conditions.14 However, such declaration by the legislature
is always subject to judicial review.15 In the present case, the legislature
declared that a public economic emergency existed in Minnesota and that
it was deemed imperative to pass this legislation for the public good.16
And the United States Supreme Court, after noting that the legislation
was temporary in character and that it was limited to the exigency which
called it forth, upheld the act as a proper exercise of the police power by
that state, due to the economic emergency existing in that state.
The Court is very careful to point out that the emergency does not
give the state the power to pass such a law but only creates the occasion
for the exercise of its inherent police power; Chief Justice Hughes say-
ing, "While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the
occasion for the exercise of that power. 'Altho an emergency may not
call into life a power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may
afford a reason for the exercise of a living power already enjoyed.' Wil-
son v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 348, 37 S. Ct. 298, 302."17
Judicial determination of what is a proper exercise of the police "power
by a state involves a balancing of social interests. For here, on the one
hand, is the social interest in the security of contract obligations; while
on the other, is the social interest in our economic social structure. Thus
the court will declare legislation constitutional or unconstitutional, depend-
ing on which of the two social interests, in its estimation, weighs the
heavier. Such determination is largely a matter of judicial discretion,
and so in many cases, altho you or I might personally disagree with the
result, yet we cannot adversely criticize the decision, it being a matter
which reasonable men might rightfully reach opposite results. Never-
theless, there may be other cases, in which the court has abused its sound
discretion and reached a result which is preposterous in the light of the
circumstances; then, I think, it is possible to call the decision erroneous.
It seems that the particular case under discussion falls within the first
group, and that it would not be fitting for the writer to criticize adversely
the discretion of the court where it has been so carefully invoked.
S. E. M.
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS-CAN SECURITIES OF THE NEW CORPORA-
TION BE FORCED ON RECALCITRANT CRFmITORS?-The reorganization plan
submitted in the recent Coriell case provided that all the assets of the
14Block v. Hlrsh (1921), 256 U. S. 135, 154; People v. La Fetra (1921), 230
N. Y. 429, 440, 130 N. E. 601.
-Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair (1924), 264 U. S. 543, 44 S. Ct. 405, reversing
(1923), 290 Fed. 348; Johnson v. Jones (1925), 48 S. D. 260, 204 S. W. 15.
15Preamble of the act after setting forth the conditions in Minnesota at that
time, reads, "Whereas, it is believed, and the Legislature of Minnesota hereby
declares its belief, that the conditions existing as hereinbefore set forth has created
an emergency of such nature that justifies and validates legislation for the exten-
sion of the time of redemption from mortgage foreclosure and execution sales and
other relief of a like character; and Whereas, The State of Minnesota possesses
the right under its police power to declare a state of emergency to exist, and
Whereas, the Inherent and fundamental purposes of our government Is to safe-
guard the public and promote the general welfare of the people, etc."
27Blasdell v. Home Building and Loan Assn. (1934), 54 S. CL 231, 235.
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insolvent company be transferred to a new corporation, all claims under
$100 paid at once in cash, claims of creditors having priority by law, fees
and expenses of receiver paid or assumed by the new company and all
other creditors receive 20% in unsecured notes of the new company and
80% in its preferred stock. The receiver made no recommendation and the
creditors' committee made no written report, nor was there any itemized
statement of assets and liabilities. Bank creditors and the larger merchan-
dise creditors urged acceptance of the plan, but a substantial minority of
the unsecured creditors objected strenuously, urging that no inventory of
assets had been made by the receiver or under court order, nor the liabili-
ties so determined. They claimed that bank creditors had been preferred
and protested against disposing of the assets otherwise than for cash after
public sale and without competitive bids being sought. The District Court
ordered the receiver to accept the plan and business was begun under its
provisions. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decree, holding that
a court of equity lacks the power to compel a creditor of any kind to accept
stocks or promises to pay in the future in full extinguishment of his claim
without being afforded the alternative of receiving his full share immedi-
ately in the proceeds of the conventional sale of the property in cash, but
that here the creditors' rights could be protected by having an appraisal of
the assets and ascertaining their value as if sold at public sale and then
paying the creditors their proportionate shares and if payment were not
made in cash, these amounts could be collected by sale of the property
transferred to the new corporation. The dissenting creditors petitioned for
a writ of certiorari to review this decree and the Supreme Court thereupon
reversed the decree of the Circuit Court and vacated that of the District
Court and remanded the case for further proceedings on the ground that
the District Court's procedure was improper in that it had no definite,
detailed and authentic information, that there was no valuation of assets
by a disinterested appraiser, nor report of operations under the receiver,
nor accurate determination of creditors with the amounts of their repres-
tive claims.1
The principal case leaves undecided that long debated question of
whether dissenting creditors can be forced to accept securities in the new
corporation in settlement of their claims. There have been several lower
federal court cases and many dicta on both sides, but as yet there is no
Supreme Court decision on this point.
The question was left unsettled by the Boyd case2 which allowed an
unsecured creditor, spuing nine years after the foreclosure sale and reorgani-
zation thereunder, to upset that sale because such creditor had not been
allowed to participate on terms at least as favorable as those offered stock-
holders. The great clamor which greeted this decision failed to consider,
however, the full import of it. True, it does require that creditors must
be recognized in any reorganization in which stockholders are recognized,
but the court says further, "This conclusion does not, as claimed, require
the impossible and make it necessary to pay an unsecured creditor in cash
as a condition of the stockholders' retaining an interest in the reorganized
INational Surety Company v. Coriell (1933), 53 Sup. Ct. R. 678.
2Northern Pacific Railway Company v. Boyd (1912), 228 U. S. 482, 57 L.
Ed. 931.
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company. His interest can be preserved by the issuance, on equitable terms,
of income bonds or preferred stock. If he declines a fair offer, he is left
to protect himself as any other creditor of a judgment debtor, and, having
refused to come into a just reorganization, could not thereafter be heard in
a court of equity to attack it. If, however, no such tender was made and
kept good, he retains the right to subject the interest of the old stock-
holders in the property to the payment of his debt." It must be remem-
bered, of course, that this is sheer dictum.
Six years later it was held in the Frisco reorganizations that a judicial
determination in receivership proceedings of the fairness of a reorganiza-
tion plan is binding upon creditors, even those who have not filed their
claims in the proceedings, and that any effort by them to pursue the reor-
ganized company may be enjoined. This, while not completely in point,
would seem to be an indication in the affirmative as to the power of the
court to force acceptance by recalcitrants. The same position was taken
four years later by a lower federal court in the Rock Island case.4 This
case, while going somewhat farther in its decree, is not very strong on the
facts, since about 950o of the creditors assented to the plan and the non-
assenters offered no serious objection. The court concluded, however, that
ascertainment of the cash value could be had by the decree without any
sale and the value was fixed by the court in new stock without any cash
alternative.
Judge Manton gave a similar decree5 forcing creditors to accept ten-
year debentures, no cash price being fixed for dissenters.
Those who argue on the affirmative side of this-question have cited the
Gebhard case6 as authority, but it must be regarded as mere dictum, since
there the court was considering the effect of Canadian legislation which
would not necessarily have to comply with the requirements of due process
of law, at least, according to American ideas. However, the court went on
to say that legislation like that Great Britain has, whereunder minority
interests are bound to accept securities when the plan is approved by the
court, could be enacted here within the limits of our constitution, but
whether the court can force such interests to do so in the absence of legis-
lation was left unsettled.
Perhaps the clearest and most direct opinion now available was deliv-
ered in the Phipps case,7 where it was held that when a decree approving
reorganization secured or offered to unsecured creditors their just and
equitable shares of the beneficial interests in the reorganized company, the
court may lawfully enjoin enforcement of claims of such creditors by ex-
ecution against the property or otherwise than as provided in the decree.
'St. Louis-San Francisco Railway v. Wall (1918), U. S. D. C., E. D. Mo., E.
Dic., Cons. Cause Eq. No. 4847 (not reported). Cited in Vol. VIII of Lectures on
Legal Topics, Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing, Reorganization and
Regulation. Lecture by Robert T. Swaine at P. 143. Chicago, 1931.
4 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Lincoln Horse & Mule Commission Co. (1922),
284 Fed. 955 (C. C. A., 8th).
gRe Bijur Motor Lighting Company (1914), Judge Martin T. Manton of C. C.
of A. for the 2nd C. sitting In the D. C. (not reported). Cited in 22 Col. L. . 14.
6 Canada Southern Railway v. Gebbard (1883), 109 U. S. 527, 3 Sup. Ct. 363.7 Phipps v. Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. Co. (1922), 284 Fed. 945, 28 A. L. 1. 1184
(C. C. A., 8th).
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The court has power, it is said, to require the non-assenting minority to
accept payment, like the majority, in the stock and securities of the reor-
ganized corporation. Such creditors have then no recourse against the new
company. This seems to be, from a business point of view, a just and de-
sirable result.
There is one Supreme Court case, that of the Kansas City Railway,8
which approaches the issue in our principal case. It was held there that a
plan was fair and binding on unsecured creditors which offered them securi-
ties of the same grade as, but in a larger amount than those offered to
stockholders The court said that unsecured creditors may be protected
through other arrangements which distinctly recognize their equitable right
to be preferred to stockholders against the full value of all property of the
debtor corporation and afford fair opportunity under existing circumstances
to avail themselves of this right. If they refuse a fair offer on such prin-
ciples, they cannot attack the reorganization in a court of equity. While
this decision forces the creditors to take securities to which they objected,
it does not appear that the creditors had made any plea for cash payment,
but were only insisting that their claim be preferred in its entirety to that
of the stockholders. All that was before the court in this case were ques-
tions which themselves assumed the very point the case involved. The court
criticizes these questions as lacking precision and it is possible that if the
question of alternative cash payment had been brought up by the creditors,
we might at least have had a definite answer.
There are some well-considered opinions and lower court decisi6ns
definitely on the other side. Judge Learned Hand set aside a sale to the
reorganized company under a plan whereby general creditors were to get
preferred stock in the new company, saying,9 "A bankruptcy court under
no circumstances will, or indeed, can compel creditors to accept an aliquot
interest in the assets of the bankrupt under the guise of a sale.... The
dissenting creditors must be paid in cash their own proportion of the bid,
which is their inviolate right. . . . They have the right to have those
assets (of the bankrupt) converted into money and nothing can invade or
impair that right, unless it be by statute."l0
A Michigan casell allowed the creditor to assert his claim against the
reorganized company, but the facts there were stronger in his favor than
in most cases, for there was evidence of fraud, the offer being for stock
unauthorized by the Railroad Commission and which, if issued, would
violate certain statutes.
It was said in Harding v. American Sumatra Tobacco Co.,12 "To deprive
a creditor of his usual remedies and force him into membership in the cor-
poration which he only credited seems to me to be of very dubious correct-
s Kansas City Terminal Railway Company v. Central Union Trust Company of
New York (1926), 271 U. S. 445, 46 Sup. Ct. 549.
'In re Prudential Outfitting Company of Delaware, Inc. (1918), 250 Fed. 504
(D. C., S. D. N. Y.).
nSee also Kneeland v. American Loan Co. (1890), 136 U. S. 89, 34 L. Ed.
379, and Merchants' Loan & Trust Company v. Chicago Railways Co. (1907), 158
Fed. 923 (C. C. A., 7th).
-Wabash Railway Company v. Marshall (1923), 224 Mich. 593, 195 N. W. 134.
**Harding v. American Sumatra Tobacco Company (1926), 14 Fed. (2d) 168
(D. C., N. D. Ga.).
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ness, however convenient and cheap it may be to reorganizers and however
justly disappointing to recalcitrant minorities, who may be trying to force
the majority to buy them out to get rid of them."
Obviously the right of unsecured creditors must be preserved, but must
it be preserved at the expense of a much larger group of also meritorious
parties and can it not be adequately preserved otherwise than in cash after
a forced sale? It is practically impossible for a large corporation to reor-
ganize without bringing in the old stockholders, first, because they control
the technical ability to run the business and second, because they are more
ready to put up the necessary funds in view of their previous investment.
If creditors must be paid in cash, reorganization is unreasonably checked.
Often it occurs that these creditors themselves are at a disadvantage in
forced sales and distribution afterward. Their share of the proceeds may
be, and, in fact, usually is only a fraction of their just claim. On the other
hand, if the reorganized company were allowed to carry on the business,
probably a much higher per cent of their claims would eventually be paid
the unwilling participants.
Even if this were not true, it seems inharmonious with equitable prin-
ciples that the technical rights of a few objectors should preclude a large
majorii of willing participants from a chance to recover their larger
losses. -. hether the obstructive tactics of selfish minorities are less dan-
,erous than the chance of tyranny by the majority has not been decided
by the highest tribunal or by any great weight of authority among lower
courts. It would seem, however, assuming that the reorganization plan
has been approved after deliberation by an accurately informed court, and
a large majority of the interested parties assent, that the courts should
have the power to make the plan binding, even though there is no sale and
no caih is distributed to the dissenters. Upon consideration of the more
recent decisions and dicta, it would seem that there is a trend toward recog-
nizing such power in the courts, even in the absence of legislation.
M. C. M.
E,. DENcE--DYING DECLARATIONS-APPEAL AND ERROR-S. was con-
victed of murdering his wife by poisoning her with bichloride of mercury.
Defendant appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, con-
tending that a statement of Mrs. S. to her nurse had been erroneously ad-
mitted in evidence as a dying declaration. The statement was, "Dr. Shep-
ard has poisoned me." It was made two days after Mrs. S.'s illness had
begun, at a time when she was greatly improved and was not thought by
her physicians to be dangerously ill. At the trial, the declaration was
offered and received as a dying declaration. The defense had advanced the
theory of suicide, and produced evidence that indicated a suicidal intent on
the part of Mrs. S. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the statement was not admissible as a dying declaration, but was admis-
sible for the purpose of rebutting the evidence of suicidal intent, and
affirmed the conviction. Defendant brought certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States. Held, judgment reversed. Testimony ad-
mitted at the trial for an illegitimate purpose cannot be considered in the
appellate court as if admitted for a different purpose unavowed and unsus-
